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Sergio Tenenbaum 
THE CONCLUSION OF PRACTICAL REASON 
Aristotle’s famous contention that the conclusion of practical reasoning 
is an action (see Aristotle 1984) (henceforth “the Aristotelian Thesis”) 
often baffles action theorists. I will first examine a few reasons to object 
to the Aristotelian Thesis; these objections seem to support the view that 
the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. However, I will 
argue that this is not a tenable position, and I will propose a way to 
understand the Aristotelian Thesis that can overcome these objections. 
The first part of the paper examines the case against the Aristotelian 
Thesis, and in favour of the main alternative view, the view that the 
conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. It seems that the 
Aristotelian is vulnerable to a few rather obvious objections, while the 
alternative view seems to face none of these difficulties. The following 
sections try to show that appearances here are wholly deceptive. In the 
second section, I argue that when we properly understand the subject 
matter of the Aristotelian Thesis, that is, when we understand what can 
be properly considered a conclusion of practical reason, it turns out that 
the alternative view is indefensible. The third section argues that, on the 
other hand, with this proper understanding of its subject matter in hand, 
we can show that the Aristotelian Thesis is immune to the objections 
canvassed in the first section. 
Before we move on, a piece of terminology is helpful. The conclusion 
of practical reasoning is not a prediction about how one will act or intend 
(see, on this issue, Korsgaard 1997). This can be registered by adding a 
‘should’ to the conclusion (“I should turn the light on”). It is my view, 
however, that if the Aristotelian Thesis is correct, this way of writing the 
conclusion is a categorical mistake. So in order not to prejudge the issue, 
I will write the conclusion of practical reasoning as an intention or 
action, depending on the view being discussed, but maintain throughout 
that good practical reasoning (or a sound argument in the practical 
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sphere) justifies, rather than guarantees the truth (or the reality) of the 
intention or the action. 
1. The Case Against the Aristotelian Thesis 
The Aristotelian Thesis seems to be vulnerable to the following 
objections: 
(1) An agent intends an action only under a particular description. 
(2) Whether we succeed in carrying out a particular action does not 
depend solely on our reasoning capacities. 
(3) Sometimes one does not act on the conclusion of practical 
reasoning (Robert Audi raises a similar objection in 1989, p. 93). 
Let us start with (1). Actions have an “accordion effect” (this term 
was coined by Joel Feinberg; see his 1965). To use Davidson’s well-
known example, by flipping the switch, Mary may turn on the light, and 
also inadvertently alert a prowler (Davidson 1980). In this case, all these 
actions might be identical: 
(a) Mary’s flipping the switch. 
(b) Mary’s turning the light on. 
(c) Mary’s alerting the prowler. 
It is somewhat controversial how actions should be individuated, and 
indeed whether the actions described by (a), (b) and (c) are actually one 
and the same action, or whether a narrower criterion for action 
individuation is more adequate (for a survey of the available positions, 
see Mele 1992). Since the objection is far more powerful if we assume 
that actions are individuated in this broad manner, I will assume that, if 
“A -ed” and “A -ed” are action descriptions, and that if “A -ed by 
-ing,” then “A -ed” and “A -ed” refer to the same action. With this 
assumption in place, there seems to be an obvious problem with the 
Aristotelian Thesis. For certainly a sound piece of practical reasoning is 
made unsound by substituting descriptions of the same action. 
Let us take, for instance, the following reasoning: 
I. I want to (intend to, shall) read in the bedroom. 
II. I believe that in order to read in the bedroom, I must turn the 
light on. 
Therefore, 
III. I turn the light on. 
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This seems like a valid piece of practical reasoning. One might dispute 
whether, for instance, premise (I) should not be substituted by an 
evaluation (such as ‘is desirable’ or ‘is good’; see Scanlon 1998), or, of 
course if premise (II) should not state a fact as opposed to a belief, (see 
Thomson 2001, Ch. 2), etc. But it seems that some revised version of the 
reasoning above should turn out to be valid, at least if we leave aside for 
the moment the idea that any such piece of reasoning can count as valid 
only on the assumption of some kind of ceteris paribus clause, or that 
considerations that counted against turning the light on did not provide 
reasons not to perform the action that were strong enough to override the 
above reasoning.1 
But if by turning the light on, I alert a prowler, it seems that (III) 
could be substituted by the following: 
IV. I alert a prowler. 
However, it seems that an argument that concluded (IV) from (I) and (II) 
would be invalid. One might object that the substitution in question is not 
allowed by the Aristotelian Thesis. After all, substituting co-referring 
expressions doesn’t necessarily preserve the validity of an argument or a 
piece of reasoning. I doubt, however, that this move can work. For the 
Aristotelian Thesis does not claim that the conclusion of practical 
reasoning is the statement of an action, or a proposition that describes a 
certain action. It claims that it is the action itself. In theoretical reasoning 
substituting different statements of the same proposition2 in an argument 
should not make a difference to its validity; similarly, we should also 
expect that substituting descriptions of identical actions should not make 
a difference to the validity of a piece of a practical reasoning if we accept 
the Aristotelian Thesis. One could quibble further, but I will assume that 
the Aristotelian Thesis is committed to allowing such substitutions.3 
It might be worth examining a defence of the Aristotelian Thesis that 
concedes some of these points. One might think that although there is 
nothing wrong about having a sentence of the form “I intend to . . .” as 
the conclusion of practical reason, it would be wrong to deny the 
Aristotelian Thesis on this basis. Although I can move from a belief to 
                                                           
1 Although we are leaving this aside for the moment, that the argument needs such 
assumptions will be a central concern of this paper. 
2 Talk of “propositions” in this way often sets off a number of warning bells. But since 
one’s views on the nature or existence of propositions should not affect the point here, I 
will ignore them. 
3 Since my aim is to defend the Aristotelian Thesis, if this assumption turns out to be 
false, it would only bolster my case. 
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another by (theoretical) reasoning, it would be wrong to say that the 
conclusion of my reasoning is a belief, rather than its content. Similarly, 
although I form the intention on the basis of reasoning, it would be 
wrong to say that the conclusion of the reasoning is my intention rather 
than its content. And the content of the intention is an action (see Clark 
1997, especially pp. 19-20). However, this line of reasoning is problem-
atic in a few ways. First, what we get is a rather different version of the 
Aristotelian Thesis. On this reading, the Aristotelian Thesis turns out to 
be a claim about what is represented in the conclusion of a practical 
reasoning. The more contentious Aristotelian Thesis does not merely 
present a contrast between what is represented in the conclusion of 
theoretical and practical reasoning (the latter must be the representation 
of an action, former a representation of anything), but states that the 
latter is not a matter of representing, but of doing something. In 
Aristotle’s words “whenever one thinks that every man ought to walk, 
and that one is a man oneself, straightaway one walks” (Aristotle 1984, 
701a8-12, emphasis added). Moreover, if we reject the more radical 
Aristotelian Thesis and think of the conclusion in terms of the content of 
the intention of someone who reasons properly from (I) and (II), it is not 
clear that we should then accept that the conclusion of a practical 
syllogism is an action, rather than something that is brought about 
through the action, and in fact, a particular description of something that 
is brought about through the action (for a similar point, see Hornsby 
1998, pp. 88-89). The content of the intention is not the action of my 
turning the light on, but rather “that the light is turned on,” an effect 
brought about by my action. If one accepts Davidson’s individuation of 
actions, there will be many effects for each action, and thus one cannot 
identify the action with what it brings about. Of course, one might take 
issue with Davidson’s individuation of actions. But it is worth noting that 
one would need a rather fine-grained individuation of actions. For one 
would need a different action not only for each different effect, but a 
different action for each different possible object of intention. Assuming 
that Mrs. Jones is the prowler, “alerting the prowler” and “alerting Mrs. 
Jones” describe the same effect, but they are two different possible 
objects of intention (that is, one could intend to alert Mrs. Jones, but not 
intend to alert the prowler). 
Let us now turn to objection (2). Suppose I go through what seems to 
be the same piece of deliberation, but instead of turning the light on, I 
inadvertently flip the alarm switch on. But now since I did not perform 
the action described in (III), it seems that, if the conclusion of a piece of 
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practical reasoning is an action, the only conclusion available to me is the 
following: 
V. I turn the alarm on. 
Concluding (V) from (I) and (II) does not speak very highly of one’s 
intellectual powers. Yet, whatever my general limitations are, what I am 
displaying in this particular case is clumsiness rather than stupidity. One 
could reply that, in the absence of action, I should be regarded as 
concluding nothing at all. But this seems implausible; after all, it seems 
that I set myself to act because of the conclusion of a piece of reasoning. 
Alternatively, one could say that the action that concluded my practical 
reasoning should not be described as turning the alarm on, but rather as: 
VI. I flip the switch. 
However, even if we ignore the difficulties raised by objection (1), this 
cannot take us very far. If I am clumsy enough, I can also fail to flip the 
switch after deliberating in this manner. It seems that the only retreat that 
might accomplish anything, at least under certain views of the nature of 
mental states,4 is to stop at a mental action that might be completely 
under the control of the agent, such as forming an intention or making a 
decision.5 But this grants the opposition their point, since those who deny 
that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action will likely argue 
that the conclusion of practical reasoning is the formation of a certain 
mental state (such as an intention, decision, etc.). 
A final reply is open to the “Aristotelian.” She can say at this point 
that the conclusion of the practical reasoning at this point is the 
following: 
VII. I try to turn the light on. 
For any such case, we could characterize the action as one of trying. It 
will turn out that this suggestion is essentially correct, but as it stands it 
seems problematic. One might now want to say that if (VII) is the only 
thing that (I) and (II) and my logical skills can guarantee, then the 
conclusion of any piece of practical reasoning must be a case of “trying.” 
                                                           
4 This qualification is necessary, since in some views there might be no “non-disjunctive” 
relevant mental states that are fully in control of the agent. For a view that suggests this 
possibility, see Hornsby (1998).  
5 Taking those mental states to be actions is itself problematic since it seems to generate 
an infinite regress. That is, if forming intentions are actions, then one should form 
intentions intentionally, and, under a plausible view of action, that means, that under 
certain description of this action, one intended to form an intention. But this means that 
one must have formed the intention to form the first intention.  
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But this suggestion faces a serious problem. If trying is anything that is 
not fully under my control, such as a bodily movement, even the most 
rational agent could fail to move from (I) and (II) to (VII) by sheer bad 
luck. If it is just a mental action or a mental event of some kind, then it 
seems that we are getting perilously close to the view that the conclusion 
is just an intention.6 And this leads us directly to (c). For we would need 
to stretch the notion of “trying” pretty thin in order to cover all cases of 
practical reasoning. For suppose Larry wants to go for dinner this 
evening. Now it is 11:45, and he knows that he needs to call the 
restaurant at 12:00 to make reservations. He forms the intention to call at 
12:00. Here it seems that Larry is done with the practical reasoning, and 
even if he were to die at 11:55, this would not change the fact that he had 
successfully carried out a piece of practical reasoning. His death would 
have prevented the action, but not the reasoning. Thus the conclusion of 
practical reasoning is not an action. 
None of these problems seem to arise if instead of (III) we have, as 
the conclusion of (I)-(II): 
VIII. I intend to turn the light on. 
We cannot substitute “alert the prowler” for “turn the light on” in the 
context of an intention, and intentions can certainly fail to be carried out 
by clumsiness, death, etc.7 The case against the Aristotelian Thesis seems 
compelling.8 
                                                           
6 There is also another problem. It seems that what I should aim as the result of practical 
reasoning is the action itself, not an attempt. Although it is true that any time we X, we 
thereby also try to X, it is unclear that having X-ing and the attempt to X as one’s aim 
amount to the same thing. If aim to hit a good serve, I will be concerned with the 
existence of obstacles, and I will try to remove them (I will, for instance, wait for the 
wind to stop blowing). But if I am concerned only to try to hit a good serve, I will not care 
about any external obstacles to my serve going in (no matter how hard the wind blows, my 
attempt will be flawless). 
7 I will assume that intentions are not actions. Although this makes for simpler presen-
tation, rejecting this assumption will still leave room for a distinction between the 
Aristotelian view and its main alternative. The views would be distinguished as a different 
between which action should be regarded as the conclusion of practical reasoning: the 
intention to X, or carrying out the intention to X.  
8 The same advantages can be claimed for the view that the conclusion of practical 
reasoning is a practical judgment. See, for instance, Audi (1989). 
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2. Practical Reasoning and Soundness 
Before we move on, we need to say a few words on what counts as valid 
and sound instances of practical reasoning. Of course, I do not mean here 
to give a complete account of the issue, but just place some constraints 
on these notions that will be relevant for the argument in this paper. 
First let us start with the premises. We can distinguish between two 
kinds of premises that appear in practical reasoning. There will be 
premises that are possible contents of a belief clause, and whose 
soundness depends on whether the premise is true. On the other hand, 
there will be premises that specify a certain end or aim of the agent. The 
soundness of these premises will depend on whether the end is 
appropriate, correct, or one that the agent should have. I hope these 
remarks are neutral with respect to various views about the nature of 
practical reasoning. So, for instance, I do not assume that an instance of 
practical reasoning needs to have premises of the second kind. So, 
someone who thinks that desires, preferences, etc. are irrelevant to 
practical reasoning, will think that there are no premises of the second 
kind, and, perhaps that each premise describes the content of a belief of 
the agent (though some of the beliefs will be evaluative beliefs) or that 
all the premises are fact-stating propositions (though some of them state 
evaluative facts). A “subjectivist” about practical reason might think that 
all premises of the second kind are sound as long as they specify the 
content of the agent strongest desire, or the content of his relevant 
preferences, etc. 
I will define an “acceptable conclusion” as follows: A conclusion is 
acceptable if and only if it is a conclusion that a fully rational agent 
would, or at least could, accept if she were in a relevantly similar 
situation. What counts as relevantly similar will vary from theory to 
theory, but it will probably involve having similar beliefs and 
preferences, that the agent be under similar time constraints, etc. The 
central idea is that an agent who is committed to an unacceptable 
conclusion is, on that account, irrational. I will assume that the following 
are unacceptable conclusions: a conclusion in which (or a conclusion that 
recommends that) one knowingly chooses a less preferred over a more 
preferred option, or a conclusion in which one takes (or a conclusion that 
recommends taking) what one knows to be insufficient means to one’s 
ends. Depending on the details of one’s theory of practical reason, 
different conclusions would count as unacceptable; I hope to use for my 
purposes only relatively uncontroversial examples of unacceptable 
conclusions. Similarly, a “fully rational agent” is one who is never guilty 
330 Sergio Tenenbaum 
of any kind of irrationality, but what counts as such an agent depends to 
some extent on one’s theory of practical reason: here too, I hope to steer 
away from controversial examples.9 Drawing an acceptable conclusion 
does not guarantee that the agent will do well, or even as well as possible 
for an agent in such a situation, for the agent might, for instance, lack 
important information. 
We can now state constraints that will play an important role in the 
argument: 
(C1) A valid piece of reasoning never leads from sound premises to an 
unacceptable conclusion. 
(C2) If an agent acts irrationally then one of the following must be the 
case: 
(a) The agent forms noninferential beliefs irrationally. 
(b) The agent forms noninferential aims or ends irrationally. 
(c) The agent performs an invalid piece of reasoning. 
(d) Another irrational process that can be attributed to the agent 
takes place. 
(C1) is a relatively weak requirement on good (or valid) practical 
reasoning. Good practical reasoning should not move us from true beliefs 
and appropriate aims into a position in which we are guilty of some form 
of irrationality. This a rather basic constraint on good reasoning in 
general: that it should not take us from “unimpeachable” starting points 
into an irrational stance.10 Indeed one could argue that a stronger 
constraint is also quite plausible: good reasoning shouldn’t take us from 
acceptable premises into unacceptable conclusions. However, since I 
only need the weaker claim, I will commit myself only to (C1). (C1) is 
also formulated in such a way as to be neutral between whether the 
                                                           
9 Of course a general sceptic about practical reason will not accept anything as an example 
of practical irrationality. But it is not clear to me that for such a sceptic practical 
reasoning is possible; general scepticism about practical reason would probably render 
this issue moot. 
10 This is not to say that all good reasoning is truth-preserving; no doubt, inductive 
reasoning is not like that. It also does not mean that we cannot end up with an 
unacceptable conclusion as the result of good reasoning; one would need then to conclude 
that some of one’s premises were unacceptable, and, ceteris paribus, one would consider 
revising at least one of them. See Harman (1986). Harman does not endorse the use of 
notions such as “valid” for reasoning (since they seem to confuse reasoning and 
argument), but as long as one keep the distinction between reasoning and argument clear, 
I don’t see any reason not to use the word ‘valid’ for reasoning that is conducted solely in 
accordance with correct or appropriate rules of inferences. However, substituting ‘good’ 
for ‘valid’ would not alter in any way the argument of the paper. 
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conclusion is an action or an intention. Certainly rational agents both 
intend and act, and they could both intend and act rationally or 
irrationally. 
(C2) simply tells us that if an agent acts irrationally, then the agent 
must be guilty of some specific failure of rationality. The general idea of 
(C2) is that there could be no “blameless” irrationality.11 The failure of 
rationality might be due to an irrational starting-point or to irrational 
inferences, but as long as the agent forms all cognitive states as a rational 
agent would, the agent could not be guilty of irrationality. Clause (d) just 
covers the possibility that we overlooked a cognitive failure that cannot 
be assimilated to (a)-(c); I leave it there since the arguments presented 
for the Aristotelian thesis do not depend on (a)-(c) covering all possible 
instances of irrationality. 
I will also make a couple of assumptions: As I said above, I treat the 
following as cases of irrationality: (a) the agent knowingly acts counter-
preferentially; (b) for which the agent knowingly pursues ineffective 
means to her ends. Although someone might find instances of (a) and (b) 
which it might be contentious whether the agent behaved irrationally, the 
examples I use are fairly straightforward. Also for the sake of 
convenience, I will assume that the agents we discuss have preferences 
similar to those that we expect that most agents have (they prefer more 
over less money; they prefer not to destroy their property, etc.), and that 
these preferences are in no way irrational. 
Finally, it is also worth adding that although I assume that we can 
attribute instances of practical reasoning to agents, I am making no 
assumptions about the ontological commitments of this attribution. 
Perhaps each step in the agent’s practical reasoning must reach 
consciousness, or perhaps each must have some kind of psychological or 
physical reality, even if they do not reach consciousness; perhaps, the 
attributions are fully determined by questions about how to best interpret 
the behaviour of the agent as rational, etc. My only commitment is to the 
possibility of attributing these instances of practical reasoning to the 
agent. 
                                                           
11 I am not going to argue for this claim, so it is open to the “anti-Aristotelian” to argue 
against this claim. However it would be surprising to conclude that the anti-Aristotelian 
position is hostage to the possibility of blameless irrationality; those who reject AT 
typically do not reject it on these grounds. 
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3. The Case against the View that the Conclusion of Practical 
Reasoning Is an Intention 
Let us now look more carefully at the Aristotelian Thesis. Take the 
following pieces of reasoning: 
IX. No honest person becomes a millionaire just by chatting. 
X. I am an honest person. 
XI. If I intend to become a millionaire, I should do something other 
than chatting. 
XII. If something is good in some respect, then I have some reason to 
pursue it. 
XIII. Every beautiful thing is good in some respect. 
XIV. Thus, I have some reason to pursue anything that is beautiful. 
Now these are valid pieces of reasoning, and let us assume that all the 
premises are sound. Certainly these arguments do not have an action as a 
conclusion. They also seem to be species of practical reasoning. So do 
not we have here a fast refutation of the Aristotelian Thesis? If the 
Aristotelian Thesis is plausible at all, we need to restrict its scope. In 
particular, the Aristotelian Thesis is absurd if it does not exempt 
arguments that have undetachable or conditional conclusions. It does not 
follow from (XI) or (XIV) that I should do something other than chatting, 
or that I should pursue beautiful things, or that I should do anything 
whatsoever. Rather the conclusions of these arguments are conditional 
statements, explicitly in the former, and implicitly in the latter. That is, 
the latter argument at most concludes that whenever nothing cancels this 
reason, and there are no overriding reasons not to pursue a beautiful 
thing, I should pursue beautiful things. The Aristotelian Thesis can be, 
however, only a thesis about detachable or unconditional conclusions. 
This restriction should not surprise us. The “job” of practical reasoning 
cannot end at a conditional conclusion. Insofar as one has not yet settled 
on a course of action, practical reasoning has not yet come to a rest, and 
thus one cannot see any such conclusions as any more than inferential 
steps in a larger piece of reasoning. Thus, more generally, we can say 
that the Aristotelian Thesis is a thesis about proper termini of practical 
reasoning, not about the conclusion of any thinking that has possible 
human ends as a subject matter. To restrict the Aristotelian Thesis in this 
way is just to clarify that the relevant notion of a “conclusion” here is the 
notion of something that can be regarded as a real terminus of reasoning 
that is indeed practical (as opposed to something that could be the end 
point of idle speculation). 
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Let us go back to our first argument with this clarification in mind, 
with the conclusion explicitly stated as an intention as in (VIII). Is (VIII) 
an unconditional conclusion? It seems that if this is a valid piece of 
reasoning, the answer is “no.” Let us assume again that the premises are 
all sound. For suppose I were also aware that the children are asleep and 
I will wake them up if I turn the light on, and that I would like to read, 
but I much prefer not to wake the children up than to read. In this case, 
the conclusion of the argument would specify an intention to act against 
my preferences. In accordance with (C1), we cannot consider the 
argument as it stands to be valid and unconditional. A fully rational agent 
would not choose to act in way that obviously goes against his own 
preferences. As we said above, the validity of the inference depends on 
adding a ceteris paribus clause. So far we must read the conclusion as “If 
everything is equal, I intend to turn the light on” as a conclusion.12 So, if 
we want to assess the truth of the Aristotelian Thesis, we should 
investigate an argument that does not have a ceteris paribus clause. Can 
we get rid of the ceteris paribus clause, while still holding on to the view 
that the conclusion of the reasoning is an intention? One simple way to 
do this is to add to the reasoning the following premise: 
IIa. Everything else is equal. 
Adding this premise seems, at first, to do the job. One can complain 
that this does not present the agent’s full reasoning, since it does not say 
why the agent thought that everything else was equal. But even this flaw 
can be perhaps fixed if we move away from presenting the agent’s 
reasoning as a form of practical syllogism. Indeed the practical syllogism 
seems to capture only a fraction of the agent’s reasoning. An agent 
typically weighs various pros and cons of a situation, and, one could 
argue, a proper representation of practical reasoning should bring to light 
this kind of procedure. Moreover we could get rid of the ceteris paribus 
clause altogether by registering all the relevant considerations. Now, this 
seems hardly feasible in practice,13 but at least it can show us how a valid 
piece of practical reasoning that would have an unconditional conclusion. 
                                                           
12 Another way to secure the validity of the argument with an unconditional conclusion is 
to argue that practical reasoning is non-monotonic. See on this issue, Brandom (2001). I 
leave this possibility aside for the moment and come back to it at the end of the paper. 
13 Especially if we think that part of the reasoning involved registering indifference about 
various things. After all it is not a matter of logic, for instance, that moving my left foot 
first when I start walking towards the switch is no better than moving my right foot first, 
and thus, arguably the full representation of the reasoning would involve listing every 
single aspect of the action the agent is about to undertake (or at least every single aspect 
that the agent does or could foresee) in comparison to the alternatives.  
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If we now add (IIa) to the reasoning, or further premises specifying 
all the relevant considerations that weighed in the decision to turn the 
light on, can (VIII) be rightly considered the terminus of practical 
reasoning? Now even if one thinks that the conclusion of practical 
reasoning is an intention, one will not think that the agent’s practical life 
ends at the formation of intentions; the point of forming intentions is to 
carry them out in actions.14 Suppose now the straight path to my light 
switch goes through my computer, which I can easily, but damagingly to 
the computer, shove out of the way. Had I taken this route I would have 
carried out my intention, but my action would no longer be justified by 
the relevant piece of reasoning. For surely the reasoning left out the fact 
that it would not be worth trashing the computer. But if this is the case 
the reasoning does not warrant this particular intention. Assuming that I 
am fully aware that taking this route should knock the computer in this 
manner, I act against my preferences if I take this route, and thus 
irrationally. In accordance with (C2), given that we need not assume that 
there is anything wrong in the way I form beliefs or desires, and since 
there is no unusual cognitive process that could take the blame for my 
irrationality, my irrationality must be due to bad reasoning. Indeed, it 
seems independently clear that the reasoning can make my intention 
rationally acceptable as it stands. For, unless our intentions have certain 
autonomous benefits,15 our intentions can only be justified if we are 
justified in carrying them out. And in this case, I am not rationally 
warranted to carry out my intention, at least, not to carry it out in any 
possible way. Of course one could protest here that although not all ways 
of carrying out the intentions are justified by this piece of practical 
reasoning, at least some of them are. But this reply concedes that the 
intention is not the proper terminus of practical reasoning: insofar as we 
want to allow that some instances of practical reasoning are valid, the job 
of practical reasoning is not done when we form this intention, for, given 
that not just any way of carrying out the intention is warranted by the 
reasoning above, in order to know how to act I must also know which 
ways of carrying out the intention would be appropriate. 
Still, the critic of the Aristotelian Thesis might argue that this simply 
shows that the intention needs to be further specified. First one might say 
that given that the agent was aware of the existence of the computer in 
                                                           
14 For instance, Thomson claims that the Aristotelian Thesis is “at best suspect,” but later 
argues that practical reasoning is reasoning “about what to do” (Thomson 2001, pp. 79 
and 82, emphasis added). 
15 Such as the benefits of forming the intention to drink toxin in Gregory Kavka’s toxin 
puzzle. See Kavka (1983). 
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the path to the light switch, this must have been a relevant consideration 
in forming the intention, and thus should be part of the content specified 
by the intention. But this will not do. First, note all that needs to go into 
the content of an intention if I need to represent all the foreseeable ways 
in which carrying out the intention might be acceptable or unacceptable. 
If I am going to turn on the light in my room, and now I am in the next 
room over (a rather simple intention to be executed), I must represent the 
layout of the room, and my path towards the room, make sure that I keep 
in mind all possible obstacles, represent how I will move my arms and 
legs so as to avoid the possible obstacles, think about what can happen in 
my room that can make turning the light on in a certain way problematic, 
represent more precisely how I am going to turn on the light, etc. It is 
quite implausible that this is all even implicitly represented in forming 
the intention to turn the light on; indeed implausible enough that we 
might want to reconsider the plausibility of the Aristotelian Thesis. But 
suppose one were ready to bite the bullet here, and argue that I do 
represent all these things when I form the intention to turn the light on. 
This still will not suffice. Insofar as the intention precedes the action,16 
and the action is extended through time, the agent could always become 
aware of new, relevant information while he executes the intention. It 
seems that any intention that can be the conclusion of practical reasoning 
must take into consideration the possibility that in executing an intention, 
the agent might face unexpected, but relevant, facts. One could try to 
handle these problems in one of two ways. One could first try to make 
the intention so specific that it will rule out the possibility of unexpected 
“twists” while one acts. In this case, the intention could be something 
like: 
VIIIa. I intend to walk through such and such a path to reach the light 
switch and then turn the light on. 
This is a short-lived improvement. For specifying the path is not all I 
need to do. I could take this path but flip the switch with my mouth, both 
experiencing the (I imagine) unappetizing flavour of light switches, and 
exposing myself to germs in such a way that may outweigh the value of 
switching the light on. The problem is that by just getting more and more 
detailed about my plan cannot rule out in advance that, while I act, I will 
                                                           
16 Could one say that the intention that is the conclusion of practical reasoning does not 
precede the action, but is an intention in action? I discuss this point below, but in a 
nutshell this would surrender most of the advantages that the view is suppose to have over 
the Aristotelian Thesis, and would make it virtually indistinguishable from the 
Aristotelian Thesis. 
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face previously unforeseen information that is relevant for how I act. The 
general problem should be clear: the intention that is supposed to be the 
conclusion of practical reasoning, the intention that guides me in action, 
is the representation of something general. But the action is a particular. 
Thus there always are aspects of the action that were not represented in 
the intention, of which I become aware while I execute the intention. 
Since each aspect is potentially relevant for the evaluation of my action, 
the way I carry out my intention can never be fully justified by the 
practical reasoning that issues in this intention. It might be thus better to 
deal with the unexpected by representing it in a general form in the 
agent’s intention. Perhaps the relevant intention is something like the 
following: 
VIIIb. I intend to turn the light on while always making sure that, as far 
as I can tell, no foreseeable effect of my carrying out the intention 
in a particular way outweighs the value of the action. 
(VIIIb) succeeds in covering the whole ground by quantifying over all 
foreseeable effects of my action. However (VIIIb) is also a conditional 
conclusion, or at least a conclusion that leaves the job of practical 
reasoning unfinished. It has a form equivalent to “I intend X unless C,” or 
“I intend to X in some way” (but the correct way of doing it still needs to 
be figured out), and for this reason it cannot determine in any particular 
way how I should act. In sum, no matter how one further specifies the 
intention, given that the intention is general and the action is particular 
one will be facing the following dilemma. On the first horn, one would 
say that any way of carrying out the intention specified in the conclusion 
would be justified by a piece of sound practical reasoning. But this route 
is hopeless; given that there are indefinitely many ways of carrying out 
an intention one would expect that some of them could turn out not to be 
rationally justified. On the second horn, one would say that only some 
particular ways of carrying out the intention are justified by a piece of 
sound practical reasoning. But if this is the case, the intention can’t be 
the terminus of practical reasoning, for one cannot yet act in a justified 
manner until practical reason can specify which particular ways of 
carrying out an intention are justified. 
One could say that the problem here is not with further specifying the 
intention, but with individuating the appropriate stages of one’s 
behaviour such that a specifiable intention corresponds to each. I have 
assumed that while carrying out an intention one might become aware of 
certain things one hadn’t been aware of (or couldn’t have foreseen) at the 
time that the intention was formed, but that, once one is made of aware of 
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them, this would render certain ways of carrying out the intention 
irrational. If I could not foresee an obstacle when I formed my intention 
to turn on the light (for instance, there are shards of glass in my way to 
the light that cannot be spotted from where I was), but have become 
aware of it while executing the intention in time to avoid to obstacle, it 
would be irrational of me to continue to carry out the original intention in 
such a way as not to avoid the glass shards. However, one may object 
that this assumption is plausible only if we do not ascribe a separate 
intention to each “choice node.” We do not turn the light on by merely 
directing our will towards this end, but we take steps in the direction of 
the light switch, we move our hand in the direction of the switch, we 
press it down, etc. Each of these steps presents a choice situation, in 
which we need to make a decision; each of these steps, the objection 
goes, requires a separate intention. Since there are no choice nodes 
between each of these intentions, there is nothing that I can become 
aware of between the time I form each of these intentions and the time I 
finish executing them that could make a difference to the rationality of 
my actions, since there is nothing I can do between choice nodes. 
Now, I do think that this is the most promising way to reply to the 
objection. No doubt the number of intentions that need to be postulated 
will be quite high, but given that part of the problem here is that there 
seems to be so much reasoning that goes into an action, this crowding of 
intentions might not be so objectionable. It would also be unfair to 
protest that it is it hard to believe that we think to ourselves each of these 
intentions after explicit deliberating about it in our mind. After all, it is 
hardly a minority view that some intentions and some deliberations do 
not show up in the agent’s life as explicit, occurrent thoughts. 
However, this option will end up facing a few serious problems. The 
first one is that it is not so clear how different this proposal is from the 
Aristotelian thesis itself. It is hardly likely that this approach would 
succeed in postulating a separable intention for each stage of the action. 
Rather it would probably rely on the existence of what is sometimes 
called “intention in action”; that is, an intention that is an aspect of my 
intentional action, not an event that can be separated from it. Given the 
omnipresence of such “stages” at almost any moment in which one is 
carrying out a continuous action, it seems that in this approach we need 
to look at the decision embodied in carrying out the action at each step, 
rather than the decision to carry out the action. But in this case, the gains 
of moving to this conception of practical reasoning are rather limited; the 
conclusion of practical reasoning here is still inseparable from the action 
itself. And if the conclusion of practical reasoning is something that is 
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inseparable from the action itself – indeed something that can be de-
scribed as an aspect of the action – one seems to have gotten quite close 
to conceding, if not fully conceded, that the conclusion of practical 
reason is an action. Indeed, the main advantages of taking intentions to 
be the conclusions of practical reasoning, at least in dealing with 
objections (2) and (3), seemed to rest precisely on the fact that it took the 
conclusion of practical reasoning to be separable from the action, 
something that could occur even when reasoning did not issue in an 
action. Moreover this view would have to find a way to parse the relevant 
intentions in continuous actions. For instance, when I am running, it 
seems that I can decide to stop at any moment, and at any moment my 
failure to do so could be a failure of deliberation. 
Indeed this problem becomes particularly difficult when we try to 
understand how this suggestion would deal with the skilful execution of 
an intention. Let us look at two tennis players, a rather skilled one, and 
one who is learning to make the shots. For our present purposes, the 
second player is going to be an idealization, since we will assume that he 
proceeds by explicitly reasoning how to turn his hand, how to place his 
racket given the trajectory of the ball, etc., and still has time to make the 
shot. They both enter the court with the intention to win the game, and 
they will form, on this view, various more specific intentions throughout 
the game. Suppose now they face the exact same situation: the opponent 
returns a serve in such a way that she leaves one side of the court 
completely open. Both come to the same conclusion about what to do in 
this situation: each must send a hard shot to that side of the court. Now 
the unskilled tennis player cannot just hit the shot; the job of practical 
reasoning is not yet over for him. He must try to figure out the 
approximate speed and trajectory of the ball, calculate the angle he wants 
his racket to be at, how hard he has to hit it, etc. For the unskilled player, 
this view is no doubt committed to saying that these were stages of the 
action that required further deliberation and further intentions. But what 
about the skilled player? Here this view will face a dilemma. On the one 
hand it seems that we are committed to saying that there are no further 
stages of this action. For a certain period of time, the skilled player will 
not have acted under any intention other than “hitting a hard shot on the 
deuce side.” If asked why he had his racket facing down at a sharp angle, 
he might not even recognize that he did anything that fell under this 
description. Indeed, if the skilled player misses the shot, it would be a 
bad shot. It would not be an instance of irrationality; it would not be an 
instance of failing to deliberate correctly about how to carry out the 
intention to hit a hard shot on the deuce side. If we look back at (C2), 
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none of conditions (a)-(d) seem to apply to this case. The same is not 
true, or at least not necessarily true, of the unskilled player. The unskilled 
player settles on the position of the racket by deliberating on the issue, 
and thus, at least in the case in which he is aware of all the relevant 
information, if the unskilled player chooses the wrong angle, she will 
have deliberated badly. Thus since there were no more specific intentions 
about how to carry out the intention to hit a hard shot on the deuce side, 
we seem to come to a conclusion that there are no further stages of the 
action. However, this view seems also equally committed to the existence 
of further stages of this action. For the agent could change the course of 
the action at any moment, and this fact could be relevant for evaluating 
whether the conclusion of her practical reasoning was warranted or 
acceptable. One could, for instance, ask: “Didn’t you notice that there are 
children running across the court all the time? And that a child whom you 
couldn’t see at the time you decided to hit the shot could run to the deuce 
side of the court and be there just in time to be hit by the ball? Do you 
care more about winning a game than about the welfare of a child?” It is 
certainly possible that the appropriate answer here is something like: 
“Any such child would have to appear in my field of vision before my 
racket hit the ball, in which case I would just send the shot in a different 
direction.” No doubt the availability of such an answer is relevant to the 
acceptability of the agent’s reasoning, and thus it seems that we need 
some reasoning that has the conclusion “I can go ahead and hit my shot” 
just before the skilled tennis player hits the shot. But since the conclusion 
of practical reasoning under this view is always in an intention, so it 
seems that we are at same time, under this view, required to say that there 
are further stages in the action of the skilled player. The problem is that 
skilful execution of an intention is a way in which we carry out an 
intention such that we are still in control of our actions (and we still 
could thus revise the intention) but not by means of further, more specific 
intentions, as would be required by the view in question; in these cases, 
one carries out an intention without representing the way in which one is 
carrying out the intention.17 
                                                           
17 No doubt one could continue the argument here, by trying to say, for instance, that the 
further stages can be characterized as various intentions to continue carrying out the 
original intention. I do not think that this strategy would work since we would need more 
determinate ways of specifying the intention to continue, and given the nature of skilful 
execution of intentions, this might not be possible. But at any rate, my aim is to establish 
that such a view would have enough problems that it is worth reconsidering the 
Aristotelian Thesis. 
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One might be tempted to do away with these problems by advocating 
a hybrid view: that the conclusion of practical reasoning is sometimes an 
intention and sometimes an action. But it seems hard to prevent this 
concession from turning into full surrender. For after all most of our 
actions are stretched through time, and most of them require some kind 
of skilful execution of one’s intentions. Before we set ourselves to 
protect such an enclave for the view that intentions are the conclusion of 
practical reason, we should re-examine the plausibility of the Aristotelian 
thesis in light of our revised understanding of its subject matter. If the 
Aristotelian Thesis can answer these questions, the issue of whether or 
not such an enclave can be protected might be moot. 
4. The Objections against the Aristotelian Thesis Reconsidered 
If the above arguments are sound, a piece of practical reasoning will not 
be able to justify an unconditional intention, since particular ways of 
carrying out the intention (and in some cases all particular ways of 
carrying out the intention) will turn out not to be warranted by the 
apparently valid piece of practical reasoning. In general, we see that what 
needs justification is not only the general end represented in the 
intention, but the particular way in which one carries out the intention; 
indeed, practical reasoning ideally should justify that no particular way 
of carrying out the action would be more advisable. Thus the only thing 
that could be properly warranted as the unconditional conclusion of 
practical reasoning is the particular way of carrying out an intention, and 
thus the action itself. What the practical syllogism justifies is the 
particular action carried out by the agent, not the intention itself. (I) and 
(II) justify my particular action of turning on the light, but they could 
not justify the intention, since many ways of carrying out the intention 
would not be warranted in light of such beliefs and desires.18 The more 
perspicuous way of writing (III) would be: 
IIIa. This particular action of turning the light on. 
There is no issue here of a ceteris paribus clause; since the conclusion is 
the action itself, either it is justified, and thus there was nothing that 
made it unwarranted, or it is not justified, and thus the inference is 
invalid. This approach also provides us with a quite straightforward 
response to the objections raised against the Aristotelian Thesis. First, 
                                                           
18 Although, again, a conditional intention could be justified. 
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although it is true that we intend the action only under a particular 
description, whether the action is justified must take into account more 
than the description under which I intended it. For at least unintended but 
foreseen consequences will play some role in assessing the soundness of 
my reasoning.19 Moreover, assuming that (I)-(IIIa) is valid, and that by 
turning the light on I alerted the prowler, rewriting the conclusion as 
follows would still give us a valid inference: 
IIIb. This particular action of alerting the prowler. 
Since the action itself was justified by (I)-(II), picking out by means of a 
different phrase could make no difference to this fact; the fact that (IIIb) 
can also pick out the conclusion of my action, for instance, certainly 
doesn’t violate (C1); a fully rational agent could perform the action 
describe in (IIIb), even she would not intend it under this particular 
description. No doubt writing (IIIa) as the conclusion makes the validity 
of the inference more perspicuous. This is all no different from 
theoretical reason: substituting equivalent propositions might turn an 
obviously valid argument into one whose validity only a skilled logician 
could establish. 
Certainly we may fail to carry out an intention for reasons that have 
nothing to do with our reasoning capacities – for instance if I were to die 
before I could carry out my intention. This case is unproblematic for our 
account: were I to die I would never have derived the unconditional 
conclusion. 
Moreover we can understand the case in which I clumsily do 
something other than what I intended as a case in which the conclusion of 
practical reasoning is indeed an attempt such as: 
VIIa. This particular action of trying to turn the light on. 
Since there is no doubt here that ‘trying’ here refers to the “outward” 
action, there is no danger of having the conclusion slide back into a 
mental state. 
One might also complain that the reasoning from (I)-(IIIa) cannot 
represent the full reasoning of the agent. For, after all, (I)-(II) could not 
justify the actions by themselves. Had it been the case that I knew I 
would have electrocuted myself by flipping the light switch, I would not 
be justified in turning the light on, even if I wanted to read. But although 
this is true, I do not think it follows that in this case (I)-(II) were not 
                                                           
19 This is not to say that it makes no difference whether an effect is intended or foreseen. 
However, even the most adamant defender of the doctrine of double effect will not argue 
that we should simply disregard foreseen but unintended consequences. 
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sufficient to justify the conclusion. Since the conclusion is a particular 
action, and not a general claim about what one ought to do in these 
circumstances, the truth of that counterfactual does not affect the validity 
of the inference. Since the inference is not supposed to justify a certain 
general description of an action, the fact that another action falling under 
the same description would not be justified by the same premises is 
irrelevant to assessing the acceptability of the inference in question.20 
Could not the same be said about the account that takes an intention to be 
the conclusion of practical reasoning; that is, that the inference warrants 
the intention to turn on the light on this particular occasion? But here 
again the intention that I can form even on this particular occasion is still 
a conditional one: the intention spelled out at (VIIIb). There is no escape 
from the fact that practical reasoning comes to a rest only when the 
action is completed. Thus anything that stops short of the action itself 
must be the intervening chapters, rather than the conclusion, of practical 
reason. 
One might be surprised here at the disanalogy between theoretical and 
practical reasoning. After all, it is also true that if it rains, it rains in a 
determinate way. But this neither seems to affect our views about the 
acceptability of conclusions such as “It will rain tomorrow” nor does it 
make us think that these are not proper resting points for theoretical 
reasoning. However, we can see why this disanalogy holds. The aim of 
theoretical reasoning is knowledge or true belief. But if it is true, say, 
that it will rain heavily tomorrow, it is still true that it will rain 
tomorrow. The fact that it will rain tomorrow in a particular way does not 
make the statement “it will rain tomorrow” any less true. But the aim of 
practical reasoning is “right” or “justified” action. But it does not follow, 
for instance, from the fact that one is justified in eating that one is also 
justified in eating heavily.21 
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